RESEARCH ARTICLE
Game Analysis on Urban Rail Transit Project Under Governmental Investment Regulation
Liangliang Yuan1, 2, *, Yousong Wang1, Honghui Huang2
Article Information
Identifiers and Pagination:
Year: 2016Volume: 10
First Page: 369
Last Page: 378
Publisher ID: TOBCTJ-10-369
DOI: 10.2174/1874836801610010369
Article History:
Received Date: 12/12/2015Revision Received Date: 24/3/2016
Acceptance Date: 19/04/2016
Electronic publication date: 23/06/2016
Collection year: 2016
open-access license: This is an open access article licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 International Public License (CC BY-NC 4.0) (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/legalcode), which permits unrestricted, non-commercial use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the work is properly cited.
Abstract
Urban rail transit is the construction project under the planning and huge investment of the government. How to effectively conduct investment regulation and control becomes the core question that the government departments are concerned about. In this paper, the relations among government, owner and contractor are studied and the static and dynamic game model is built for behaviors among each subject from the perspective of governmental investment regulation through game theory. Game analysis result shows: (1) the lower the governmental regulation cost the heavier the government's punishment for the owner due to its fail in due diligence and the more the owner's possibility of strict scrutiny; (2) the higher the owner's examination the less willing the owner to conduct narrow examination and the more contractor’s possibility to choose fraudulent conducts; (3) In case of higher income of owner and contractor under their collusion strategy and lower cost of governmental regulation, the owner and contractor can adopt collusion strategy while the government can adopt regulatory strategy. In case of lower income of owner and contractor under their collusion strategy and higher cost of governmental regulation, the owner and contractor should not adopt collusion strategy while the government should adopt regulatory strategy. The research result provides theoretical basis for the government to formulate relevant policies for investment regulation of urban rail transit project.
